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DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/WMDT; DHS FOR DNDO (CAROLINE BRAY)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2019

TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [KGIC](#) [UK](#)

SUBJECT: GICNT INVITATIONS DELIVERED TO UNITED KINGDOM

REF: A. STATE 22354

[B](#). STATE 18574

[C](#). STATE 9099

[D](#). 08 STATE 123059

[E](#). 08 LONDON 3185

Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills, Reasons 1.4 (b, d).

[1](#). (SBU) Poloff, accompanied by diplomats from the Russian and South Korean embassies, shared details of the upcoming Seoul meeting of the Exercise Planning Group (EPG) / Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) (refs A & B) with Sharon McDonald, CBRN terrorism desk officer at the FCO's Counter-Proliferation Department on March 12. Poloff provided objectives and draft agenda to McDonald who indicated that given the timing of the Seoul EPG meeting and the following GICNT workshop in Garmisch, Germany, the UK would likely not be able to send technical experts to both. HMG will probably send staff from the UK Embassy in Seoul to participate in the EPG.

[2](#). (SBU) Poloff delivered (ref C) details on the GICNT workshop in Germany to McDonald on February 17. McDonald confirmed March 12 that the UK would be sending Mark Furnival, United Kingdom Border Agency and Barry Warren, Atomic Weapons Establishment to participate in the workshop. Furnival and Warren will be prepared to facilitate a review of the relevant technical section of the Model Guidelines Document (MGD) at the workshop.

[3](#). (C/NF) McDonald did share some impressions of the GICNT process, which she asked Poloff pass on to ISN and DHS. While HMG appreciates the useful sequence of GICNT events, the timing of two meetings (the EPG and the MGD review workshop) so close together, one in Korea and the other in Germany, puts an undue burden on British technical experts -- taking them away from their work. Additionally, biannual GICNT meetings, she said, speaking personally, might be too frequent, and she wondered if annual meetings would be preferable.

[4](#). (C/NF) Regarding EPG draft agenda item (e) -- discussions on shifting biannual efforts from EPGs to Activity Coordination Groups (APGs) -- McDonald expressed the concern that if government and technical expert representatives would be expected to be at the newly-fashioned APGs, a substantial amount of coordination would be necessary in order to ensure that the technical experts' time was used effectively and not wasted in meetings where they would not be required. McDonald said HMG appreciated the use of "breakout" groups that she understood the GICNT workshop envisioned because these groups would provide a good opportunity for experts to discuss sensitive issues. She added that HMG would appreciate any information on what complimentary work is being coordinated between GICNT and the IAEA (or other international organizations responsible for physical protection of fissile material.) Lastly, McDonald asked us to keep HMG informed in advance if we envisioned any changes to the GICNT process under the new Administration.

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